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Introduction 
Following the progress made by the civil rights movement to secure 
educational opportunities for racial and ethnic minority students in 
landmark decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education,1 civil rights 
advocates and policymakers were able to use prior successful legal stra-
tegies and challenges to secure educational rights for students with 
disabilities.2 Several of the earliest legal challenges to school segregation 
 
†  Assistant Professor of Special Education, New York University Steinhardt 
School of Culture, Education, and Human Development. I thank Robert 
Strassfeld for his comments on my draft, and I thank Taru Taylor for his 
timely research assistance. 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. Id. Many school systems that were already under a court’s desegregation 
order were more likely to be found to have discriminatory placement patterns 
in their special education programs. For instance, in Lee v. Macon County 
Board of Education—a lawsuit filed by civil rights attorney Fred Gray 
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involved separate classrooms and instruction for students with a dis-
ability or the disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic mi-
nority students with disabilities within the most restrictive special 
education settings in public schools.3 In the decades following the 
 
against one school board—parents (on behalf of their children) sought an 
injunction to prevent the Macon County School Board from continuing to 
run schools segregated by race. See Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 221 F. 
Supp. 297, 297–98 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (issuing an injunction against maintaining 
a segregated school system and the race-based assignment of teachers and 
school employees). Eventually, the case expanded to include the Alabama 
State Board of Education and over one hundred local school systems. See 
Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 745 (M.D. Ala. 1964) 
(expanding the case to the Alabama State Board of Education); Lee v. Lee 
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (granting 
state sought declaration that its schools had achieved unitary status and 
compliance with the court’s earlier orders regarding elimination of the ves-
tiges of de jure segregation as it related to special education in its schools). 
In 1997, Judge Myron Thompson, in the Middle District of Alabama, called 
on the parties in twelve of these cases to negotiate a settlement of the suits 
that would bring the districts to unitary status, a process whereby the district 
eliminates the effects of any past segregation to the most practical extent 
possible. Lee, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 1358–59. Within the course of the discovery, 
plaintiff parties found that, in addition to segregation by race, there was also 
evidence of overrepresentation of African American students in the “mentally 
retarded” disability category and underrepresentation of African American 
students in the “learning disabled” and “gifted” disability categories. Lee v. 
Butler Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A.70-T-3099-N, 2000 WL 33680483, at 
*2 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2000). 
 During 1997 and 1998, all parties initially met and engaged in discovery and 
negotiated consent decrees to address, among other things, issues regarding 
disproportionate representation. Id. at *1–2. Four major components of the 
decree were agreed upon. First, changes to policies and procedures within 
the special education placement and related services process (e.g., pre-
referral, referral, evaluation, and identification stages) and changes to the 
eligibility criteria must be addressed by each Local Educational Agency 
(LEA). Id. at *2–4. Second, there must be extensive teacher training regarding 
etiology and characteristics by specific disability type. Id. at *3. Third, 
funding for general education curriculum must address literacy issues and 
services for at-risk students. Id. at *5. Finally, there must be extensive state 
monitoring of placement and identification practices set forth by each LEA. 
Id. at *4. In 2000, the parties resolved to enter into a consent decree to 
resolve racial disproportionality in special education placements, and a con-
tinuing review of progress continued until 2006. See Lee v. Lee Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., No. 3:70cv845-MHT, 2006 WL 1041994, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 20, 
2006) (approving the consent decree). Current federal statutory special edu-
cation disproportionality provisions closely resemble this decree. 
3. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) outlines a range of 
special education settings and placements for students with disabilities that 
exist on a continuum. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement 
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2005) (codified as 20 U.S.C. 1400 
et seq.). Under IDEA 2004, eligible students with disabilities in public schools 
must be educated, to the maximum extent appropriate, with children who do 
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Brown decision, racial and ethnic minority students gained access to 
integrated classrooms. Over time, however, student placement by 
factors such as ability-level grouping, disability category, and academic 
achievement produced patterns of internal resegregation for racial and 
ethnic minority students in desegregated schools.4 Even though 
students with disabilities and students without disabilities share a 
vibrant civil rights legacy in regards to securing educational rights and 
opportunities, the achievement gap between students with and without 
disabilities persists.5 Moreover, decades of research affirms that racial 
and ethnic minority students have often been reported to be both 
under- and over-identified for special education and related services.6 
Disproportionality is a complex phenomenon, but it can best be 
defined as the overrepresentation or underrepresentation of a racial or 
ethnic minority group in special education relative to the presence of 
this group within the overall student population.7 According to a 2016 
report issued by the National Center for Education Statistics, approxi-
mately 13.5% (6.5 million) of all students in K-12 public schools receive 
special education and related services.8 The percentage of students 
 
not have disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 2005). Students 
with disabilities can only be educated in a more restrictive setting when the 
severity of the student’s disability sufficiently impairs the student’s ability to 
be in a general education classroom. Id. 
4. Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, & Gary Orfield, The Civil 
Rights Project, Harvard Univ., A Multiracial Society with Seg-
regated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? (2003). 
5. Janette Kettmann Klingner et al., Outcomes for Students with and without 
Learning Disabilities in Inclusive Classrooms, 13 Learning Disabilities 
Res. & Prac. 153 (1998). 
6. Paul L. Morgan et al., Are Black Children Disproportionately Overrepresented 
in Special Education? A Best-Evidence Synthesis, 83 Exceptional Child. 
181 (2017); 34 C.F.R. § 300–99 (2016); Dalun Zhang et al., Minority Represen-
tation in Special Education: 5-Year Trends, 23 J. of Child and Fam. 
Stud. 118, 123 (2014). 
7. See Julie M. Bollmer et al., IDEA Data Ctr., Methods for Assessing 
Racial/Ethnic Disproportionality in Special Education: A Tech-
nical Assistance Guide (Revised) (2014) (providing technical assistance 
and interpretation of disproportionality methodology). For purposes of this 
discussion, the terms “disproportionality” or “disproportionate representation” 
are synonymous. The terms “under-representation” and “over-representation” 
are specifically used within this discussion to designate a placement at either 
end of the spectrum. The term “significant disproportionality” is used solely in 
relation to regulatory provisions within the Individuals with Disability Edu-
cation Act.  
8. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., Children and Youth with Disabilities 
1 (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/pdf/coe_cgg.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/K8SH-SJ2E]. 
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served under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)9 
is highest for American Indian/Alaska Native students (seventeen 
percent), followed by African American/Black students (fifteen 
percent), White/Caucasian students (thirteen percent), students of two 
or more races (twelve percent), Hispanic students (twelve percent), 
Pacific Islander students (elevent percent), and Asian students (six 
percent).10 
Studies that have examined disproportionate representation in 
special education have identified various factors to explain the presence 
of disproportionate representation including teachers’ race and eth-
nicity bias, school-level characteristics such as student population size, 
rural/urban school district classification, or student- and parent-level 
characteristics such as family-level income, parental education attain-
ment, or disability category of the student.11 However, studies have had 
inconclusive or contradictory findings as to which of these factors pre-
dominately account for disproportionality within a district.12 A 
criticism of studies in this area is that some studies are only 
correlational in nature or have not adequately addressed causal factors 
such as discriminatory practices, procedures, or racial, ethnic, and 
gender bias in the referral and evaluation process.13 Because of the 
uncertainty regarding the underlying causal factors for disproportionate 
representation within special education, federal law has required that 
local educational agencies (LEAs) monitor, report, and identify ways to 
address disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic minority 
students in special education.14 
 
9. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2012). 
10. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., supra note 8, at 2. 
11. See generally John L. Hosp & Daniel J. Reschly, Disproportionate Repre-
sentation of Minority Students in Special Education: Academic, Demo-
graphic, and Economic Predictors, 70 Exceptional Child. 185, 190 (2004) 
(examining representation rates of racial and ethnic minority students in 
special education using district-level academic, demographic, and economic 
predictor variables); Russell J. Skiba et al., Achieving Equity in Special 
Education: History, Status, and Current Challenges, 74 Exceptional 
Child. 264 (2008) (offering a history of disproportionate representation in 
special education and providing recommendations based on racial and ethnic 
disparities found within special education practices). 
12. See, e.g., Skiba et al., supra note 11, at 264 (stating that “a number of 
factors may contribute to disproportionality”); Amanda L. Sullivan & Aydin 
Bal, Disproportionality in Special Education: Effects of Individuals and 
School Variables on Disability Risk, 79 Exceptional Child. 475 (2013) 
(finding that a student’s gender, race, socioeconomic status, and number of 
suspensions are the most reliable predictors of disability identification). 
13. Morgan et al., supra note 6. 
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1418(d)(1) (Supp. IV 2005). 
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Even with monitoring and enforcement provisions in place, there 
are concerns that states fail to adequately monitor and identify the 
disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic minority students 
in special education. In 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office issued a report on racial and ethnic overrepresentation in special 
education in U.S. public schools.15 The report examined the character-
istics and extent to which LEAs provide coordinated early intervening 
services (CEIs) when overrepresentation is found, how states determine 
which LEAs are required to provide CEIs, the types of CEIs provided, 
and what constituted oversight by the State Department of Edu-
cation.16 The report found that, even though overrepresentation is con-
sistently cited as an education practice concern by education re-
searchers, most states actually do not identify problems in their districts 
regarding over-identification of minority students in special education.17 
The report concluded that some of the examined states did have some 
instances of district-level and state-level overrepresentation within the 
oversight process.18 However, a lack of uniformity across states’ dispro-
portionality monitoring and measures made it more difficult to make 
state comparisons or interpret findings of disproportionate represen-
tation.19 
In 2014, the Department of Education submitted a Request for 
Information to address significant disproportionality20 under section 
618(d) of IDEA, which included a specific request to the public to sub-
mit comments for recommendations for how to best address significant 
disproportionality based on race and ethnicity in the identification of 
children for special education, placements, and disciplinary actions.21 
After an impassioned public comment period, the final Department of 
 
15. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-137, Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act: Standards Needed to Improve Ident-
ification of Racial and Ethnic Overrepresentation in Special 
Education (2013). 
16. Id. at 1–3. 
17. Id. at 7. 
18. Id. at 21. 
19. Id. at 18. The GAO report found that, of the approximately 15,000 school 
districts nationwide that received IDEA funding in SY 2010–2011, states 
only required 356 (2.4%) to allocate funds towards early intervening services 
due to significant disproportionality. Id. at 7. 
20. Request for Information on Addressing Significant Disproportionality Under 
Section 618(d) of the Individuals With Disabilities Act (IDEA), 79 Fed. Reg. 
35154 (June 19, 2014). 
21. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017 
The Future of IDEA 
1126 
Education regulations to guide states and LEAs regarding special edu-
cation practices were released in December 2016.22 
These new and revised regulations address the effects of dispro-
portionate identification, both over- and under-identification, of racial 
or ethnic minority students who receive special education and related 
services and are intended to promote equity within IDEA 
enforcement.23 The regulations are further intended to increase state 
accountability for the effects, if any, of being placed in more restrictive 
environments or in settings that lack academic rigor.24 Specifically, the 
new regulations under IDEA require that states and LEAs take steps 
to determine the presence of significant disproportionality, and to 
address and to remedy disproportionate placement, if found.25 The 
regulations also establish a standard methodology that states must use 
to determine whether significant disproportionality occurred within the 
state and in LEAs. In addition, each state must now address significant 
disproportionality by incidence, duration, and type of disciplinary 
action (including suspensions and expulsions).26 Finally, states must 
clarify their existing requirements for the review and revision of relevant 
policies, practices, and procedures when significant disproportionality 
is found. LEAs must then identify and correct the factors that 
contributed to significant disproportionality via comprehensive CEIs.27 
While the revised regulations aim to provide greater uniformity for 
states on the reporting of both over- and under-identification of stu-
dents with disabilities by race and ethnicity, the systemic identification 
of students with disabilities into special education and related services 
by race and ethnicity must be examined not only as a policy-based 
issue, but also as a legal concern for parents, school districts, and states. 
That is, even though states are, increasingly, under greater pressure to 
identify and address significant disproportionality in the placement of 
 
22. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300–99 (2016). 
23. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities; Pre-
school Grants for Children with Disabilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,376 (Dec. 19, 
2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
24. Id. 
25. The final regulations became effective on January 18, 2017. Id. 
26. The regulations highlight disparity in the discipline of students with disabilities 
by race and ethnicity as a focal concern. Specifically, each state must now 
examine significant disproportionality by incidence, duration, and type of 
disciplinary actions—including suspensions and expulsions—with the same 
statutory remedies required to address significant disproportionate represen-
tation within the identification and placement processes for students with 
disabilities. Id. 
27. These services for children must be provided to children from age three 
through grade twelve, both with and without disabilities. 34 C.F.R. § 300.226 
(2016). 
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minority children into special education, current reports indicate that 
states under-report, fail to report, or face a lack of severe penalties or 
sanctions when found to have significant disproportionality within the 
state.28 For racial or ethnic minority parents who have a child with a 
disability enrolled in an LEA that has been found to have significant 
disproportionality under IDEA, there is a growing interest in pursuing 
legal action with the limited number of legal remedies for plaintiff par-
ents and children that are available. 
The pursuit of equity regarding proportional placement for minority 
students with disabilities must also be placed within the broader pro-
vision of civil rights for racial and ethnic minority students. The contin-
uing difficulties faced by parents of racial and ethnic minority students 
who reside in districts that have run afoul of IDEA regulations must be 
viewed as a continuing civil rights concern where civil rights continue 
to be at stake. This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I focuses on 
the history of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, specific-
ally analyzing how the Act has been reauthorized over time to include 
provisions that address the disproportionate representation of minority 
students in special education. Part II examines how states currently use 
different measures to frame and, ultimately, address the problem of 
disproportionate representation and the Department of Education’s role 
in preventing over-identification. It also explores how education feder-
alism, the practice of favoring significant autonomy for states and local 
school boards, even in instances where constitutional or federal statu-
tory rights are involved, causes inconsistent definitions of dispropor-
tionality and under-enforcement of IDEA’s protection against dispro-
portionate placement. Part III examines Blunt v. Lower Merion School 
District29 and the high bar that courts set for plaintiffs who assert that 
their school district discriminated against racial and ethnic minority 
students with disabilities and allege intentional discrimination claims 
against school districts. Finally, this Article concludes by examining the 
potential impact of new regulatory changes and offering recommenda-
tions for future best practices. 
I. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and 
Disproportionality 
In the landmark Brown v. Board of Education ruling, the Supreme 
Court mandated the end of segregation within the U.S. public school 
 
28. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 81 
Fed. Reg. at 92,376 (summarizing the limitations of state reporting). 
29. 826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2011), aff’d, 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017 
The Future of IDEA 
1128 
system.30 The Brown ruling also provided the legal foundation for po-
tential plaintiffs who were parents of students with disabilities. In 1972, 
plaintiffs brought two cases to challenge the exclusion of students with 
disabilities from the public education system: Pennsylvania Ass’n for 
Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania31 and Mills v. Board of 
Education.32 The plaintiffs in PARC argued that a state law that spe-
cifically allowed public schools to deny services to children “who have 
not attained a mental age of five years”33 at the time they would typi-
cally enroll in first grade violated both the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection clauses of the 14th Amendment.34 The district court agreed to 
enforce a negotiated consent decree that required the state to provide 
each child with a disability a free, appropriate public education that 
was individualized and based on that child’s capacity and that acknowl-
edged a due process right to a hearing prior to any change in a student’s 
educational status or assignment.35 As a consequence, the state began 
to provide free education to children with disabilities up to age 21.36 In 
articulating the idea of a free, appropriate public education, the PARC 
court established the “appropriateness standard” that Congress would 
later adopt within federal special education legislation.37 
In addition, the Brown ruling provided the foundation for subse-
quent legislation requiring access to public education for students with 
disabilities.38 Parents of children with disabilities spent years advoca-
ting for the passage of civil rights legislation for students with dis-
abilities,39 and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 
(EAHCA) has been hailed as a fruit of those labors.40 Under the 
 
30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
31. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
32. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
33. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 282. 
34. Id. at 283. 
35. Id. at 302–03. 
36. See, e.g., Gabriela Brizuela, Note, Making an “Idea” a Reality: Providing a 
Free and Appropriate Public Education for Children with Disabilities Under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 595, 
598–603 (2011) (describing PARC and early government responses to the 
case to remedy a history of discrimination against children with disabilities). 
37. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142, 
§ 4, 89 Stat. 775, 775–76 (1975) (incorporating “free appropriate public 
education” as an educational right). 
38. See, e.g., id. (providing educational assistance to all students with disabilities). 
39. Roberta Weiner & Maggie Hume, And Education for All: Public 
Policy and Handicapped Children (1987). 
40. See Note, Enforcing The Right to an “Appropriate” Education: The Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1103, 1105 
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EAHCA, a child with a disability was guaranteed the right to a free, 
appropriate public education.41 In addition, the EAHCA secured proce-
dural rights and safeguards for parents.42 In 1990, Congress renamed 
the Act the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act43 and updated 
provisions to ensure that students, ages three to twenty-one with a 
disability that serves as an educational impairment, have access to a 
“free appropriate public education”44 that provides individualized spe-
cial education and related services to prepare them for “further edu-
cation, employment, and independent living.”45 Thus, an LEA must 
provide special education and related services to any student who meets 
the criteria for one (or more) of the thirteen IDEA-eligible disability 
categories and who has demonstrated that he or she has a disability 
that serves as an education impairment.46 After a student has been 
evaluated and classified as a student with a disability under IDEA, an 
Individualized Education Program (IEP), a written and mutually agre-
ed upon document, is drafted and finalized by the IEP team. This team 
can include parents, special education and general education teachers, 
specialists, or school counselors. The mutually agreed upon IEP is then 
reviewed periodically and revised to ensure that the student’s needs and 
progress toward measurable goals are met.47 
Services for IDEA-eligible students are meant to be individualized 
for each student and based on non-discriminatory identification and 
evaluation methods, but concerns about discriminatory practices and 
disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic minority students 
 
(1979) (explaining how the EAHCA resulted from state recognition that 
federal funding and procedural safeguards were necessary in order to provide 
free and appropriate public education to students with disabilities). 
41. See EAHCA, Pub. L. 94-142, at § 3. Under the IDEA, a free and appropriate 
public education (FAPE) includes special education and related services that 
“have been provided at public expense under public supervision and direction, 
and without charge, meet the standards of the State educational agency; 
include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school edu-
cation in the State involved; and are provided in conformity with the Individ-
ualized Education Program required.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A)–(D) (2012). 
42. EAHCA, Pub. L. 94-142, at § 5. 
43. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012). 
44. Id. § 1401(d)(1)(A). 
45. Id. The thirteen disability categories covered under IDEA are: Autism, Deaf-
Blindness, Deafness, Emotional Disturbance, Hearing Impairment, Intellectual 
Disability, Multiple Disabilities, Orthopedic Impairment, Other Health Impair-
ments, Specific Learning Disability, Speech or Language Impairment, Trau-
matic Brain Injury, and Visual Impairment. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (2016). 
46. 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(c) (2016). 
47. 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(1)(i–ii) (2016). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017 
The Future of IDEA 
1130 
ultimately placed in special education have been persistent and contin-
uing concerns for advocates, educators, and policymakers. In fact, dis-
proportionate representation has been identified as an education di-
lemma since the 1960s when educational researcher Lloyd Dunn found 
that between sixty to eighty percent of students identified as the “edu-
cable mentally retarded”48 were children who came from low-socio-
economic backgrounds or were classified as African American/Black.49 
Subsequently, National Research Council reports, policy briefs, position 
statements, and federal civil rights investigations have examined and 
addressed disproportionate representation as a persistent problematic 
practice in special education that requires careful monitoring.50 
Congress amended IDEA in 199751 and reauthorized it in 2004.52 
The amendment most notably addressed the issue of disproportionate 
representation of racial and ethnic minority students in special edu-
cation. The 1997 amendments required states to start monitoring and 
identifying LEAs and, if the state found significant disproportionality53 
within the LEA, the LEA was required to “provide for the review and, 
if appropriate, revision of policies, procedures, and practices used in 
such identification or placement to ensure that such policies, proce-
dures, and practices comply with the requirement of this [Act].”54 In 
2004, Congress reauthorized IDEA and “prioritized the problem of 
racial disproportionality, [in part] because neither the 1997 amendments 
 
48. Lloyd M. Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded—Is Much of It 
Justifiable?, 35 Exceptional Child. 5, 5 (1968). 
49. Id. at 6. 
50. See generally Comm. on Minority Representation in Special Educ., 
Minority Students in Special Education and Gifted Education (M. 
Suzanne Donovan & Christopher T. Cross eds., 2002) (studying the issue of 
racial and ethnic minority student disproportionate representation in special 
education); Council for Children with Behavioral Disorders, CCBD’s Position 
Summary on Federal Policy on Disproportionality in Special Education, 38 
Behav. Disorders 108 (2013); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Special 
Educ. & Rehab. Servs., 37th Annual Report to Congress on the 
Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
2015 (2015) (providing a comprehensive analysis of state compliance with 
IDEA and outcomes regarding the education of students with disabilities). 
51. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (prior to 2004 reauthorization). 
52. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 to 1491). 
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1418(d)(1) (2012) (effective Dec. 3, 2004).  
54. Id. § 1418(d)(2)(A). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017 
The Future of IDEA 
1131 
nor [the Office of Civil Rights] appeared to have had much impact on 
the problem.”55 
Within the 2004 IDEA reauthorization, Congress highlighted racial 
and ethnic minority student disproportionate representation as one of 
three priority areas for monitoring and enforcement by the states.56 To 
ensure compliance with previous policy that mandated that states add-
ress current practices, policies, and procedures when significant racial 
and ethnic disproportionality occurred, the reauthorization included 
amended language that required states to have policies in effect that 
are “designed to prevent the inappropriate over-identification or dispro-
portionate representation by race and ethnicity of children as children 
with disabilities.”57 Within the 2004 provisions, states were also re-
quired to monitor districts for “significant discrepancies” in disciplinary 
practices, which can include suspensions and expulsions.58 
Prior to the revised 2016 regulations, each state had been required 
to develop its own disproportionality monitoring system to collect and 
examine data to determine if, within the special education and related 
services processes, significant disproportionality based on race and eth-
nicity occurred in the state and the LEA.59 The older regulatory pro-
visions did not specifically define what significant disproportionality 
meant under the IDEA and allowed each state to make its own deter-
mination as to what constitutes significant disproportionality. However, 
each IDEA-funded state was required to collect and examine data per-
taining to: “(1) the identification of children as children with disabilities 
including the identification of children with IDEA-disability categories; 
(2) the placement of children with disabilities across settings; and (3) 
the incidence, duration, and types of disciplinary actions (including su-
spensions and expulsions).”60 If a state made a determination of signifi-
cant disproportionality with respect to the identification or placement 
of a child with a disability, then the state was required to provide for 
the review and revision of the policies, procedures, and practices to 
ensure compliance. In addition, the LEA with significant disproportio-
nality had to reserve the maximum amount of funds under Section 
613(f) of the IDEA to provide “comprehensive coordinated early inter-
vening services to serve children in the LEA, particularly, but not ex-
 
55. Susan Fread Albrecht et al., Federal Policy on Disproportionality in Special 
Education: Is It Moving Us Forward?, 23 J. of Disability Pol’y Stud., no. 
1, 2012, at 14, 15. 
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(3)(C) (2012) (effective Dec. 3, 2004). 
57. Id. § 1412(a)(24). 
58. Id. § 1412(a)(22)(A). 
59. 34 C.F.R. § 300.646(a) (2016). 
60. Id. § 300.646(a)(1)–(3). 
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clusively, children in those groups that were significantly overidenti-
fied.”61 Finally, each LEA had to publicly report on revisions made to 
its policies, procedures, and practices after a finding of significant 
disproportionality under the IDEA.62 
Within the 2004 reauthorization to IDEA, and to add further heft 
to the monitoring requirements for states, Congress also heralded policy 
priority with the allocation of two (out of twenty) IDEA policy indi-
cators for state IDEA compliance to disproportionality monitoring.63 
Each of the twenty indicators are related to monitoring performance 
related to implementation of Part B of IDEA for students ages three to 
twenty-one, and states must then submit the data annually to the U.S. 
Department of Education, Office of Special Education Programs 
(OSEP).64 Indicator nine requires states to identify the proportion of 
districts exhibiting “disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic 
 
61. Id. § 300.646(b)(2). 
62. Id. § 300.646(b)(3). 
63. Across the state’s monitoring of the areas covered under the indicators, the 
primary focus of the State’s monitoring activities must improve educational 
results and functional outcomes for all children with disabilities and ensure 
that public agencies meet the program requirements under Part B of the 
IDEA, with a particular emphasis on those requirements that are most 
closely related to improving educational results for children with disabilities. 
Id. § 300.600(a–e). The twenty IDEA indicators include: Graduation Rates; 
Drop-Out Rates; Participation and Performance on Statewide Assessments; 
Suspensions and Expulsions; Participation/Time in General Education 
Settings; Preschool Children in General Education Settings; Preschool 
Children with Improved Outcomes; Parental Involvement; Disproportionate 
Representation in Special Education that is the Result of Inappropriate 
Identification; Disproportionate Representation in Specific Disability Cate-
gories; Timeframe Between Evaluation and Identification (Child Find); 
Transition between Part C and Part B; Post School Transition Goals in IEP; 
Participation in Postsecondary Settings One Year After Graduation; Timely 
Correction of Noncompliance; Resolution of Written Complaints; Due 
Process Timelines; Hearing Requests Resolved by Resolution Sessions; 
Mediations Resulting in Mediation Agreements; and Timeliness and Accuracy 
of State Reported Data. See Part B Indicators, Nat’l Dissemination Ctr. 
for Children with Disabilities, http://www.drcvi.org/_literature 
_183445/Part_B_Indicators [https://perma.cc/K25L-6QE4] (last updated 
Apr. 2013) (listing the monitoring indicators identified by the Office of 
Special Education Programs (OSEP) and the related requirements found in 
IDEA for state administrators responsible for completing state performance 
plans (SPPs) and annual performance reports (APRs)). 
64. Each state’s plan for addressing each of the twenty indicators is outlined 
within the State Performance Plan, which is then included with each state’s 
Annual Performance Report. Batya Elbaum, Challenges in Interpreting 
Accountability Results for Schools’ Facilitation of Parent Involvement Under 
IDEA, 24 J. Disability Pol’y Stud., no. 4, 2014, at 206. 
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groups in special education and related services, to the extent the repre-
sentation is the result of inappropriate identification.”65 Indicator ten 
requires states to identify the percent of districts in the state with 
“disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic groups in specific 
disability categories that is the result of inappropriate identification.”66 
Finally, each state had to monitor all LEAs within the state using 
quantifiable and qualitative indictors to measure disproportionate rep-
resentation in special education and related services to the “extent the 
representation is the result of inappropriate identification.”67 
While IDEA is a progression of civil rights obtained in civil rights 
litigation, it has taken multiple amendments to the Act to delineate the 
process for determining significant disproportionality. Over time, states 
have received increasing levels of monitoring and enforcement powers 
over practices at both the state- and district-level. 
II. Disproportionality Policy Monitoring and 
Enforcement Under IDEA 
As the previous Part describes, the IDEA amendments and the 2004 
reauthorization reserved considerable discretion to the states pertaining 
to the implementation of its requirements regarding disproportionality. 
This is consistent with a strong tradition of regarding education as 
largely a state and local matter. Because statutes like IDEA, along with 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are sources 
of federal rights, education creates a terrain for shifting balances be-
tween federal and state control. Some commentators have described 
this tug of war between the federal government and the states in terms 
of education federalism.68 Professor Kimberly Robinson has defined edu-
cation federalism as “a balance of power between the federal, state, and 
 
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(3)(C) (2012). 
66. Id. 
67. 34 C.F.R. § 300.600(d)(3) (2016); 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (a)(3)(C) (2012). 
68. Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 Emory 
L.J. 125 (2006) (examining the education federalism issues arising from the 
No Child Left Behind Act); Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and 
the New Education Federalism, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 565 (2015); Rachel F. 
Moran, Bilingual Education, Immigration, and the Culture of Disinvestment, 
2 J. Gender, Race, and Just. 163 (1999) (exploring the impact of federal 
retreat from support of bilingual education in deference to the states on 
bilingual instruction); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of 
Education Federalism, 48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 287 (2013) (examining the 
deleterious impact of education federalism on school desegregation efforts, on 
attempts to rectify inequality resulting from current school finance regimes 
through litigation, and on reforms intended under the NCLB). 
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local governments that emphasizes substantial state autonomy over 
education.”69 
The strong preference for state and local control of education is not 
surprising. To begin, education has historically been a matter that fell 
within the ambit of what states and local governments did. There are 
good reasons for a predisposition for local autonomy, ranging from a 
belief that local authorities are more likely to understand the idio-
syncratic needs of their residents, to a belief that local control is likely 
to be more democratic control. History regarding such matters as school 
desegregation has demonstrated, however, that complete abdication to 
local control can undermine important federal rights. Desegregation 
has, indeed, been an area where federal rights have been aggressively 
imposed upon resistant states.70 Brown v. Board of Education 
represented a rebalancing of the federalism equilibrium in asserting that 
neither the law nor mores of states with compulsory school segregation 
could stand in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.71 
Indeed, the history of school desegregation after Brown is something 
of a cautionary tale about the perils of education federalism. A year 
after Brown in its implementation decision, Brown II,72 the Court tilted 
strongly toward local autonomy. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Warren hailed what he saw as significant progress that some school 
districts had already made since Brown.73 He added that schools might 
face particular local issues in moving toward desegregation. Conse-
quently, he added, “[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility 
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems . . . .”74 In turn, 
local federal district courts, which often were sympathetic to school 
 
69. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 Wash. 
U. L. Rev. 959, 962 (2015). 
70. Other earlier cases also recognized a federal role in education. See, e.g., Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding Oregon’s compulsory public 
education statute, which, among other things, prohibited attendance at 
private parochial schools, violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding the state’s 
prohibition of teaching foreign languages to students before 9th grade 
violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment). 
71. Other cases dealing with segregation in higher education, such as Sweatt v. 
Painter, also represented this kind of rebalancing. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) 
(finding that the legal education offered to petitioner was not substantially 
equal to the University of Texas Law School and that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause required that he be admitted to the 
University of Texas Law School). 
72. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
73. Id. at 299. 
74. Id. 
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district efforts to slow down or impede desegregation, would retain jur-
isdiction over the cases. This was to be accomplished with “all deli-
berate speed.”75 Yet, ten years after Brown, a mere 2.3% of African 
American children attended integrated southern schools.76 Only when 
the full force of the federal government intervened to rebalance federal 
and local authority by coupling the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 196577 did progress 
begin to happen regarding desegregation of southern schools. Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination by government agen-
cies that received federal money.78 The threat of losing federal funding 
became much more potent in 1965 with the enactment of ESEA which 
provided for a major flow of federal funding to schools.79 The judiciary’s 
patience with the delaying tactics of school districts also ran out. That 
growing impatience, and willingness to displace local autonomy with 
federal command, culminated in Green v. County School Board of New 
Kent County, Virginia.80 There the Court rejected the county’s 
“freedom of choice” plan, which nominally permitted African American 
children to choose to attend any school in the district, but practically 
continued segregation.81 Instead, it ordered the county to speedily adopt 
plans that would create a unitary school system.82 This confluence of 
agreement among the three branches of federal government that local 
school autonomy must give way to an aggressive assertion of federal 
rights regarding education had a powerful impact on southern schools, 
but the retreat to state autonomy began not long after the Green de-
cision. 
The impulse to defer to state and local authority in education, even 
when constitutional or other federally created rights are at stake, con-
tinues to play out. The No Child Left Behind Act of 200183 (NCLB) 
 
75. Id. at 301. 
76. John Morton Blum, Years of Discord: American Politics and 
Society 1961–1974, at 196 (1991). 
77. Id. at 178. 
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(1) (2012). 
79. See generally Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (authorizing Congress to appropriate federal funds to 
states and LEAs for the education of K-12 students). 
80. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
81. Id. at 441. 
82. Id. at 437–38. 
83. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) 
(codified in various sections of Title 20 of the U.S. Code). 
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represented a major federal effort to reform education nationwide.84 The 
Act was intended to promote educational excellence and equity by 
providing for high standards of performance and creating incentives to 
achieve those standards.85 While NCLB called for setting rigorous 
standards in core subjects and testing to monitor those standards with 
reporting requirements for schools and consequences for poorly per-
forming schools, it also, in deference to education federalism, let each 
state set its own academic standards. The results have been largely 
regarded as disappointing.86 The impact of education federalism can 
also be seen in IDEA’s treatment of disproportionality monitoring, per-
haps with similarly disappointing consequences. 
Since the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, Congress has made a 
concerted effort to maintain a balance of federal and state oversight of 
special education programs by including specific provisions for the U.S. 
Department of Education and the Office of Special Education Programs 
to monitor and enforce equitable practices for placing students, par-
ticularly racial and ethnic minority students, into special education.87 
Research conducted since the most recent reauthorization, however, 
strongly suggests that states vary widely in how they interpret and 
enforce the federal provisions.88 This is mostly due to changes in the 
methods used to measure disproportionate representation at the district 
level and state variation regarding what constitutes significant dispro-
portionality. 
The IDEA amendment and reauthorization ushered in systemic 
state monitoring and enforcement practices with a significant focus on 
numerical criteria, and this moved policymakers and school- and state-
level district leaders away from using qualitative indicators of dispro-
portionate representation to making primary use of quantitative indi-
cators. While these quantitative indicators shape problem identification 
and state response across states, they have also served to signal which 
components of the disproportionate representation monitoring and en-
forcement process under the IDEA are most relevant to any policy sanc-
tions. In 2004, the OSEP/Westat Disproportionality task force issued 
 
84. See id. (enacting legislative reform with a focus on annual state-level testing 
of all K-12 students (including students with disabilities), adequate yearly 
progress at the school-level, and teacher accountability standards). 
85. Id. 
86. For a discussion of education federalism and NCLB, see Robinson, supra note 
68, at 322–30 (explaining how education federalism undermines reform efforts 
such as NCLB). 
87. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (prior to 2004 reauthorization). 
88. Albrecht et al., supra note 55, at 1. 
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guidelines concurrent with the 2004 IDEA reauthorization that “reco-
mmended that states use a risk ratio as a means for comparing the 
probability for special education placement.”89 Broadly, a state uses risk 
ratios to measure risk for disproportionate representation by examining 
the probability that a racial or ethnic minority student with a disability 
will receive special education and related services, in relation to the size 
of the overall risk for special education placement within the state or 
district. A risk ratio “compares the relative size of two risks by dividing 
the risk for a specific racial/ethnic group by the risk for a comparison 
group.”90 For example, if a district reports that the risk for African 
American/Black children of receiving special education and related 
services for autism was 3.25 times the risk for all other children, then 
the District is essentially reporting that African American/Black child-
ren were 3.25 times as likely to receive services for autism than all other 
children. 
However, risk ratios can be difficult to interpret when there are 
small numbers of students at the district level in either the racial and 
ethnic group or the comparison group.91 In school districts where there 
were fewer than ten students in a given racial or ethnic group, the task 
force recommended an alternative weighted risk ratio out of concern 
that the risk ratio methodology might misidentify certain districts as 
having a disproportionality problem where none existed.92 Thereafter, 
many states shifted to measuring the risk of disproportionate represen-
tation via weighted risk ratios or alternative risk ratios.93 The weighted 
risk ratio combines district-level risk data with state-level demographics 
to yield standardized risk ratios for across-district comparisons,94 thus 
helping states to determine a specific racial or ethnic group’s risk of 
receiving special education and related services for a disability com-
pared to the risk for all other children when the risk is standardized 
 
89. Wendy Cavendish, Alfredo J. Artiles & Beth Harry, Tracking Inequality 60 
Years After Brown: Does Policy Legitimize the Racialization of Disability?, 
14 Multiple Voices for Ethnically Diverse Exceptional Learners, 
no. 2, 2014, at 30, 33. Westat is a statistical survey research corporation that 
provides research services to various agencies within the U.S. Government. 
See Our Clients, Westat, https://www.westat.com/about-us/our-clients 
[https://perma.cc/47K8-ZUPE] (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).  
90. Bollmer et al., supra note 7, at 22. 
91. See id. (“A risk ratio of 1.00 indicates no difference between the risks. A risk 
ratio greater than 1.00 indicates the risk for the comparison group, while a 
risk ratio less than 1.00 indicates the risk for the racial/ethnic group is less 
than the risk for the comparison group. Risk ratios can never be less than 
0.00.”). 
92. Id. at 23, 73. 
93. Albrecht et al., supra note 55, at 21. 
94. Id. at 32.  
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based on state-level racial or ethnic demographic information. By using 
a weighted risk ratio based on standardized state data, however, states 
can have similar weighted ratios for both large and small districts.95 For 
small districts, this means that small enrollment changes can impact 
the direction of overrepresentation or underrepresentation. This can 
lead to small districts being misidentified as having under-represen-
tation or overrepresentation, depending upon the state-level data. 
Finally, another popular measurement tool for states is the use of 
the alternative risk ratio where the district risk is compared against the 
statewide comparison group, thus aiding states in gaining a better un-
derstanding of whether a child from a racial or ethnic group is more or 
less likely to receive special education and related services for a dis-
ability in a district versus the risk for all other children within the 
state.96 Unlike the weighted risk ratio or the risk ratio, the alternative 
risk ratio is also a more reliable measure when districts have only a few 
children in one or more racial or ethnic groups, which enables states to 
evaluate both district disproportionality and to compare children from 
a racial or ethnic group in a district to children from other racial or 
ethnic groups within the state.97 
In an analysis of data from state Annual Performance Reports to 
examine progress made in identifying disproportionality, Albrecht and 
colleagues (2012) found that a number of states subsequently shifted 
from using a standard risk ratio approach to using a weighted or alter-
native risk ratio with criteria for disproportionate representation that 
often included “progressively larger cut-offs”98 for what constitutes dis-
proportionate representation. By providing states a set of alternatives 
to using traditional risk ratios to compare the probability of special 
education placement, federal policy and recommended practices have 
also allowed states and LEAs to mask patterns of disproportionate 
placement and limit the “structural and historical underpinnings of the 
problem.”99 Moreover, this has led to a troubling trend across states 
where states are both able to meet the IDEA mandate and also not 
report indices of disproportionate representation by increasing the stu-
dent size minimum required for the risk ratio cutoff scores that must 
be reported to the state. With these practices, states enable themselves 
to only address disproportionality when it impacts a significant number 
 
95. Bollmer et al., supra note 7, at 32, 47. 
96. Id. at 23, 31. 
97. Id. 
98. Albrecht et al., supra note 55, at 21. 
99. Cavendish et al., supra note 89, at 33. 
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of students with higher levels of risk for special education and related 
services.100 
A second difficulty associated with disproportionality monitoring 
and policy enforcement is related to the lack of policy specificity re-
garding what constitutes significant disproportionality101 in special edu-
cation placements and settings. Until full implementation of the 2016 
disproportionality regulations occurs, each state is responsible for 
drafting and adopting its own definition as to what constitutes signifi-
cant disproportionality of minority students in special education, and 
this determination is not based on recommended determinations or best 
evidence within the field.102 The 2003 Government Accountability 
Office report examined a sample of sixteen states and reviewed each 
states’ definition of significant disproportionality based on the 2010–11 
School Year and found wide variation in definitions of the term 
significant disproportionality among the sample.103 In addition, the 
report noted that “some states’ definitions may be preventing them 
from identifying disproportionality.”104 
Under IDEA, each state must also monitor and collect data regard-
ing disproportionate representation that is the result of inappropriate 
identification. However, “inappropriate identification”105 is not defined 
within IDEA, and each state or LEA has discretion to determine which 
aspects of the identification process are practices that can be held as 
“inappropriate.”106 Some research has found that, since the 2004 reauth-
orization, the number of districts that have reported disproportionate 
representation due to “inappropriate identification” has drastically de-
creased.107 Most states currently report that there are no districts within 
each state that have been flagged as a district with disproportionality 
due to “inappropriate identification” by the district. One possible rea-
son for the decline in “inappropriate identification” flags may be due to 
additional scrutiny that comes with the flag. That is, the “inappropriate 
identification” flag serves as an automatic trigger which requires a state 
to achieve compliance within one year and to set aside funds for CEIs, 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 32–33. 
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1418(d) (2012). 
103. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Pub. No. 13-137, Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act: Standards Needed to Improve Ident-
ification of Racial and Ethnic Overrepresentation in Special 
Education 22 (2013). 
104. Id. at 18.  
105. Cavendish et al., supra note 89, at 33. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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and this may discourage states from using the “inappropriate identifi-
cation” flag as a check against any LEAs within the state that might 
be engaging in “inappropriate identification.”108 
While IDEA includes monitoring and enforcement provisions, there 
are ways for states to skirt federal policy and under-report or fail to 
report disproportionate representation. This is a troubling consequence 
of gaps within IDEA. Current policy fails to adequately address dispro-
portionality as a civil rights issue with accompanying remedies for tradi-
tionally under-represented racial and ethnic minority groups who are 
at-risk for discrimination within special education placements. This is 
true despite repeated calls for federal policy and guidelines for adminis-
trative practices to “align, resulting in consistent and effective actions 
by the states to eliminate the long-standing and still prevalent problem 
of racial and ethnic disproportionality.”109 Moreover, it also signals to 
parents of students with disabilities that IDEA’s monitoring and en-
forcement provisions for disproportionate representation lack substan-
tive sanctions at the state- and district-level when LEAs fail to comply. 
III. “Significant Disproportionality” and Intentional 
Discrimination Claims 
As state policy monitoring has been found to either inadequately 
define or find evidence of significant disproportionality across states, 
potential claimants have relied on litigation to show intentional dis-
crimination. Plaintiffs, however, face an uphill battle in using school- 
and district-level placement data to prove intentional discrimination, 
even when policy monitoring under IDEA has led to a finding that 
significant disproportionality by race or ethnicity in special education 
and related services has occurred within the plaintiff’s district. 
In Blunt v. Lower Merion School District, a group of plaintiffs alle-
ged that the Lower Merion School District (LMSD) improperly placed 
African American children in special education.110 Originally, plaintiffs 
brought the action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as a class action lawsuit, but the court declined to 
certify the class action.111 This limited the case and its eventual ruling 
 
108. Albrecht et al., supra note 55, at 22. 
109. Id. at 23. 
110. Blunt v. Lower Merion School Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2011), 
aff’d, 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014). 
111. The complicated procedural history of the case is beyond the scope of the 
article. Suffice it to say that a group of plaintiffs, including Amber Blunt and 
her parents, Crystal and Michael Blunt, filed a complaint in July 2007 
against the Lower Merion School District (LMSD) and certain school officials 
alleging violations of IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act, along with violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
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to the named plaintiffs only. The plaintiffs alleged that LMSD racially 
discriminated against a class of African American students, “in viola-
tion of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”112 The plaintiffs in the 
case were current or former African American students who were identi-
fied as having a disability by LMSD.113 Each student had received some 
special education services while also being enrolled in some general edu-
cation classes. The plaintiffs asserted that they were not “disabled”114 
or “students with disabilities”115 as defined under IDEA, and were thus 
only labeled as “students with a disability”116 due to racial discrimina-
tion.117 The plaintiffs further alleged that placement into special edu-
cation classes occurred on the basis of incorrect disability diagnoses, 
incomplete evaluations for special education eligibility, and subjective 
determinations of disability.118 In addition, the plaintiffs argued that 
there were not only a disproportionate number of African American 
children who received special education services from LMSD, but that 
plaintiffs were denied access and enrollment to advanced and college 
preparatory classes such as higher-level science courses, advanced his-
tory, and foreign language classes.119 The plaintiffs also alleged that 
 
Act of 1964, and Section 1982. Additionally, they alleged a violation of 
Pennsylvania’s public education law as a pendent state law claim. Id. at 751. 
After the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add additional plaintiffs and 
defendants, the defendants filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule 
12(b)(6). The district court granted much of the motion and dismissed most 
of the claims. Id. at 751–52.  
 After a second and then third amended complaint, what remained of the 
plaintiffs’ case were claims of violations of Title VI and Section 1983 arising 
out of racial discrimination by LMSD. Id. at 752. 
112. Id. at 751–52.  
113. Id. at 752. Throughout the discovery stage of the case before the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, there were disputed facts 
regarding the disability status of several named plaintiffs. Named plaintiff 
students contended that they did not have disabilities, but these students 
stated in their Third Amended Complaint that they were students with IDEA-
eligible disabilities. The court assumed for purposes of the case that, with 
the exception of plaintiffs Chantae Hall and Lydia Johnson, the plaintiffs 
were not students with disabilities. Id. at 753. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 760.  
116. Id. at 753.  
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 760. 
119. Id. at 753. “In 2005, the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) 
found that there was a disproportionate number of African American students 
in special education programs in [LMSD].” Id. at 757. By 2006, however, the 
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complaints to teachers and administrators made prior to the start of 
litigation regarding inadequate determinations of special education eli-
gibility and inadequate course selection options went unanswered.120 
A. Blunt v. Lower Merion School District—U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
After the plaintiffs submitted their final series of amended com-
plaints, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania considered the remaining claims in 2011.121 Plaintiffs’ first 
claim was that LMSD racially discriminated against African American 
students by assigning them disproportionately to special education 
placements in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.122 
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to “ensure that the [LMSD] properly 
educate[s] all African American students with disabilities.”123 The court 
concluded that even though the plaintiffs had provided systematic sta-
tistical evidence of racial disproportionality within the special education 
program and associated special education placements within LMSD in 
2007, 2008, and 2009, this was not sufficient to create a prima facie case 
under Title VI.124 
 
PDE closed its investigation of LMSD. In its report, the PDE claimed that 
the district now had a percentage of children with disabilities that was compa-
rable to data across the state. In addition, the PDE found that LMSD met 
special education disproportionate representation targets by race/ethnicity 
in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Id. 
120. Opening Brief of Appellants at 11–13, Blunt v. Lower Merion School Dist., 
826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2011), aff’d, 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 
11-4200).  
121. Id. at 752. 
122. Id. at 758. Title VI provides that: “No person in the United States shall, on 
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
123. Blunt, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 753.  
124. Id. at 759, 763. The Plaintiffs’ claims were made based on identification 
practices during the 2006–2007 SY and 2007–2008 SY. In the 2006–2007 SY, 
there were 6,981 students in the district. Of that, approximately 7.9% were 
African American and approximately 83.2% were Caucasian. There were 
1,187 students (17%) within the total student body who received special 
education services and approximately 14.5% of those students were African 
American students enrolled in LMSD and had IEPs. Id. at 757. 
 In the 2007–2008 SY, LMSD had 6,914 students, with 8.1% of the student 
population identified as African American and 83.1% percent identified as 
Caucasian. 1,158 students (16.7%) received some type of special education 
or related services. 14% of the students receiving those services were African 
American and 80.8% were Caucasian. Id. 
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The district court relied on a series of Supreme Court decisions 
holding that Title VI entitled plaintiffs to claims of intentional discri-
mination only.125 To make out a prima facie case under Title VI, the 
court held that:  
[P]laintiffs must show that: (1) they are members of a protected 
class; (2) they were qualified to continue in pursuit of their edu-
cation; (3) they suffered an adverse action; and (4) such action 
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of dis-
crimination.126 
The court ruled that, although a lack of “comparative evidence”127 re-
garding the treatment of similarly-situated students outside the pro-
tected class was not “fatal to a plaintiff’s prima facie case,”128 Title VI 
only reaches to instances of intentional discrimination.129 Turning to 
proof of intentional discrimination, the court noted that while statistical 
evidence of disparate impact may be an initial step towards determining 
the existence of intentional discrimination, it is not without other evi-
dence sufficient.130 Further, the ruling noted that plaintiffs’ evidence to 
support allegations that LMSD committed “various improprieties” were 
insufficient to prove a prima facie case. These allegations included: 
(1) destroying testing protocols; (2) failing to obtain parental per-
mission before conducting evaluations; (3) neglecting to notify 
parents regarding procedural safeguards available to them under 
the IDEA; (4) failing to provide drafts of individual education 
plans (“IEPs”) to parents; (5) omitting information from evalu-
ation reports and IEPs; (6) failing to conduct proper and timely 
reevaluations; (7) obtaining parental consent without providing 
all relevant documents; and (8) evaluating students to determine 
their eligibility for services under the IDEA without conducting 
evaluations.131 
 
 In the subsequent 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 SY, the number of students 
within the district did not significantly increase or decrease (6,788 and 7,072 
students, respectively), and the percentage of African American students who 
received special education services also did not significantly increase or decrease 
(13.7%, 14.3%, respectively). Id. 
125. Id. at 758–59.  
126. Id. at 758. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 759 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001)). 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 760. 
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In other words, the plaintiffs offered evidence that LMSD syste-
matically violated or ignored their procedural rights under IDEA, and 
the court held that these allegations might prove to serve as the foun-
dation for a claim under IDEA but were insufficient to prove a prima 
facie case or withstand a motion for summary judgment.132 Therefore, 
the court reasoned that plaintiffs’ evidence of “disproportionality alone” 
was not sufficient evidence necessary to meet the components of a Title 
VI prima facie case, particularly the requirement that plaintiffs must 
prove intentional discrimination on the part of LMSD, even when coup-
led with evidence of widespread procedural violations.133 Thus, the mo-
tion of LMSD for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ Title VI claims 
was granted.134 
The plaintiffs also brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alle-
ged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.135 The court granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the section 1983 claim, 
on the ground that section 1983 similarly requires proof of purposeful 
discrimination.136 The court held that the evidence that actions of the 
LMSD had disproportionate impact on African Americans was not suffi-
cient, finding that “[p]laintiffs have not put forth more than a scin-
tilla”137 of evidence that LMSD acted with a racially discriminatory 
purpose when it identified plaintiff students as disabled and offered 
special education and related services.138 This, the court held, was the 
correct ruling even if identification for special education and related 
services was somehow incorrect.139 In sum, no evidence of discrimination 
 
132. Id. at 760, 763.  
133. Id. at 763. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 To bring a successful § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “‘(1) a 
violation of a right protected by the Constitution;’ and (2) that the violation 
‘was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.’” Blunt, 826 
F. Supp. 2d at 763 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
136. Blunt, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 764–65. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. (quoting Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d 
Cir. 1989)). 
139. Id. (citing Williams, 891 F.2d at 460–61 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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short of direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such as biased state-
ments by district officials, would satisfy the court, even at the summary 
judgment stage of the litigation. 
B. Blunt v. Lower Merion School District—U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit 
On December 1, 2011, the Blunt plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal from 
portions of the District Court’s Memorandum and Judgment Order that 
granted a final summary judgment to the defendant (LMSD).140 On 
appeal, the court considered a number of questions including whether 
the district court abused its discretion in its consideration of the weight 
it gave to the plaintiffs’ evidence for the purpose of ruling on the motion 
for summary judgment.141 Relatedly, it considered whether the district 
court erred in ruling that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination in violation of Title VI and section 1983 in grant-
ing of the district’s motion for summary judgment.142 In a lengthy rul-
ing, the divided three-judge panel affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment and most notably held that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact concerning LMSD’s intent to discriminate nor 
evidence showing that LMSD or its employees intentionally discrimi-
nated against African American students.143 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed 
the entry of summary judgment against the plaintiffs’ Title VI and 
section 1983 claims and held that the plaintiffs did not establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination for either claim.144 The court further held 
that the evidence found to be inadmissible by the district court did not 
have to be considered in a light most favorable to the non-movant 
plaintiffs because it could not be introduced at trial.145 The court also 
asserted that, regardless of the summary judgment motion, the plain-
tiffs’ evidence would not have been admissible during the district court 
hearing.146 
In addition, the court reiterated the district court’s assertion that 
statistical evidence alone is not sufficient to prove a claim of intentional 
 
140. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015). On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, the appellants again brought forth claims to seek relief pursuant to 
Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment through 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 267. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 301. 
144. Id. at 302. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017 
The Future of IDEA 
1146 
discrimination because the statistical evidence did not sufficiently show 
that LMSD’s policy and practices were the actual cause of discrimi-
nation.147 The court held that, on taking the appellants’ evidence as a 
whole, there was no evidence showing intentional discrimination on the 
part of LMSD, nor was there evidence that district employees inten-
tionally discriminated against African American plaintiffs.148 Moreover, 
the court held that even though the appellants provided five years of 
statistical evidence supporting their claim that racial or ethnic minority 
students were disproportionately represented within LMSD, there were 
also evaluation procedures in place used for all students, regardless of 
race, who received special education and related services.149 Thus, due 
to the uniform evaluation procedures in place and regardless of sta-
tistical evidence showing significant disproportionality, the court held 
that “there simply is no discrimination.”150 
Chief Judge Theodore A. McKee concurred in part but disagreed 
with the affirmation of the lower court summary judgment in favor of 
the district.151 McKee took issue with the way the majority applied the 
“deliberate indifference”152 standard under Title VI, finding it incon-
sistent with precedent, difficult to prove, and more than what the sum-
mary judgment standard requires.153 He concluded that the parent and 
student plaintiffs had offered evidence that served as a sufficient basis 
for the case to move beyond the summary judgment stage by citing the 
report of Dr. James Conroy, Ph.D., an expert on disability policy, spe-
cial education, and statistical analysis.154 Conroy found, within LMSD, 
statistically significant evidence showing that both overrepresentation 
of African American students in special education classes and under-
representation of African American students in advanced placement 
classes had occurred.155 Judge McKee criticized the majority justices for 
failing to consider the expert report as part of the basis for summary 
judgment evidence because it highlighted “procedural irregularities in 
the erroneous and improper placement of African American students 
 
147. Id. at 302–03. 
148. Id. at 300–01. 
149. Id. at 300. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 305 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
152. Id. at 314 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
153. Id. at 314–20 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
154. Id. at 323–27 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
155. Id. at 323–24 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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[within the LMSD] in special education classes [that were] the result of 
bias (i.e. deliberate indifference), ineptitude, or coincidence.”156 
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition for 
certiorari, thus leaving in place the case’s dismissal and concluding a 
long, procedural fight to secure an additional pathway for the enforce-
ment of rights secured under the IDEA.157 The Third Circuit decision 
erects a significant barrier for future intentional discrimination claims, 
even if those claims are linked to both widespread violations of IDEA’s 
procedural protections coupled with statistical evidence of dispropor-
tionate representation within the LEA or district.158 In a public state-
ment after the denial of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Pub-
lic Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, which had been part of the 
legal team representing the plaintiffs throughout the litigation, released 
a statement and noted that Blunt effectively closed the door to future 
similar litigation: “The case is over. What this means is that the fight 
to reduce disproportionate and inappropriate referral to special edu-
cation will be fought on different territory. This is a national issue, and 
we are considering what strategies are most effective for the next 
step.”159 
Conclusion: The Future of Disproportionality 
Monitoring and Recommendations 
The new IDEA regulations went into effect on January 18, 2017.160 
States, LEAs, policymakers, parents and advocates must now work to 
address the revised policy provisions that require states and LEAs to, 
among other things, use a standard methodology to determine whether 
significant disproportionality based on race and ethnicity is occurring 
within the state and LEAs.161 Moreover, states must continue to address 
significant disproportionality by incidence, duration, and type of disci-
plinary action (including suspensions and expulsions) as well as revise 
 
156. Id. at 322 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
157. Allston v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015). 
158. See Blunt, 767 F.3d at 335 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (concluding that the court erroneously ruled that there was no genuine 
dispute of material fact to be determined in the case). 
159. Blunt v. LMSD, The Public Interest Law Ctr., www.pilcop.org/blunt-
vs-lmsd/ [https://perma.cc/QQD7-4ZEP] (last visited Mar. 22 2017). 
160. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities; Pre-
school Grants for Children with Disabilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,376 (Dec. 19, 
2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). States and LEAs are not required 
to comply with these regulations until July 1, 2018. Moreover, states and 
LEAs are not required to include children ages three through five in the 
review of significant disproportionality by disability classification. Id. 
161. Id. 
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policies and find comprehensive coordinated early intervening services 
when significant disproportionality is found.162 Several of the new regu-
latory provisions have been requested by special education advocates 
since the 2004 reauthorization as a way to provide greater equity and 
accountability, particularly as a way to limit systemic patterns of over-
representation such as that found within the Lower Merion School Dis-
trict.163 Yet, there are lingering concerns about the potential reach of 
the new provisions, particularly relating to students with disabilities 
who are at high risk of being disproportionately placed and identified.164 
While states and LEAs will now have greater responsibility and a 
more uniform methodological approach to disproportionate represen-
tation identification, the framework remains largely unchanged from 
the old approach based upon principles of education federalism.165 Over-
all, the new provisions continue to require states to use a standard 
methodology to determine whether there is significant disproportion-
ality based on race or ethnicity.166 Each state must set “reasonable risk 
ratio threshold[s],” and “reasonable” minimum number of students 
within a reported subgroup.167 However, states are still given great flexi-
bility as to how to determine when significant disproportionality ex-
ists.168 In fact, states can choose not to identify an LEA that has 
previously exceeded risk ratio thresholds as an LEA with significant 
disproportionality as long as the LEA is making “reasonable” progress 
in lowering its risk ratio.169 As with the previous regulations, the state 
sets its own determination for what constitutes “reasonable” progress.170 
Thus, the concern remains that the new approach to examining, iden-
tifying, and rectifying disproportionate representation of racial or ethnic 
minority students with disabilities will not adequately address the un-
derlying civil rights issues that remain.171 Moreover, coupled with case 
precedent firmly establishing that plaintiff parents and students need 
more than a showing of an IDEA finding of significant dispropor-
tionality or patterns of inappropriate district-wide identification and 
 
162. Id. 
163. See The Council for Children with Behavioral Disorders, CCBD’s Position 
Summary on Federal Policy on Disproportionality in Special Education, 38 
Behav. Disorders 108, 115–17 (2013). 
164. Id. at 114–15. 
165. 34 CFR § 300.647(b)(1)(D) (2016). 
166. Id. 
167. 34 CFR § 300.647(b)(1)(i)(A)–(D) (2016). 
168. 34 CFR § 300.647(d)(1)–(2) (2016). 
169. 34 CFR § 300.647(d)(2) (2016).  
170. 34 CFR § 300.647(b)(1)(D) (2016). 
171. Cavendish et al., supra note 89, at 38. 
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assessment procedures for special education placements to prove inten-
tional discrimination, how do potential plaintiff parents and students 
best ensure that states and LEAs are engaged in equitable practices 
and enforcement with the special education identification and assess-
ment processes? This Conclusion outlines several considerations for 
future practice. 
Moving forward, it cannot be ignored that enforcement and moni-
toring are the obligations of states and LEAs across the U.S., and that 
ensuring fidelity within this process is the primary, and in many ways 
the only, avenue for parents of racial and ethnic minority students with 
disabilities to seek equity within the special education identification and 
referral processes. Therefore, states must redouble efforts to not only 
comply with the updated IDEA regulations, but to also meaningfully 
address the underlying factors that have plagued special education for 
decades—namely implicit racial bias within the identification, referral, 
and assessment processes. In a synthesis study of disproportionate 
representation, Morgan and colleagues evaluated whether African 
American/Black children are disproportionately overrepresented in 
special education.172 Within the study synthesis, Morgan et al. found 
that evidence of overrepresentation significantly declines as additional 
“best-evidence” and individual-level student controls were added to 
study analyses.173 That is, certain studies reviewed within the Morgan 
et al. review controlled or accounted for the effect of confounding vari-
ables that limit the ability to clearly determine the existence of dispro-
portionate representation in studies conducted across the U.S. The syn-
thesis found that, in studies with additional controls, African American 
students were “significantly less likely than otherwise similar White 
children to receive special education services.”174 This finding has its 
own important implications for the civil rights of racial and ethnic min-
ority school-aged children. Along with the problem of overrepre-
sentation, it suggests that there are patterns of under-representation 
whereby minority children are denied necessary educational services 
that they are entitled to under IDEA. 
Moreover, the study called for states to “intensify the use of cul-
turally sensitive disability screening and evaluation practices.”175 Those 
practices, such as including differential screening tools and shifting dis-
ability eligibility procedures, which influence the direction of dispro-
portionate representation, whether towards over- or under-identifica-
tion, not only limit the reach of IDEA policy designed to promote equity 
 
172. Morgan et al., supra note 6.  
173. Id. at 181–98. 
174. Id. at 181. 
175. Id. at 193. 
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for students with disabilities, but may contribute to education ine-
qualities disfavoring the very students whose civil rights IDEA was de-
signed to protect.176 
Second, states and LEAs must adhere to the new regulations re-
quirement to establish a standard methodology to use in their annual 
determination of whether significant disproportionality based on race 
and ethnicity is occurring within the state. Although flexibility enables 
states to ensure that disproportionate representation is accurately iden-
tified at the LEA level, it also allows states to potentially mask the 
activity of a district engaging in significant disproportionality regarding 
placement of a particular group of racial and ethnic minority students 
with disabilities. Further, by providing states with flexible exclusionary 
criteria as to when LEAs must lower risk ratios, the equity mandate 
under IDEA remains unmet and the discourse moves from an equity 
focus to “debates over appropriate formulas for calculating overrepre-
sentation.”177 
In addition, it is incumbent upon states to view disproportionality 
enforcement and monitoring within the broader civil rights and edu-
cation context. That is, the rights secured under IDEA were to attain 
equity in education for all students with disabilities, and the continuing 
reconfiguration of IDEA compliance monitoring provisions signals that 
efforts to reduce disparities between students with and without dis-
abilities have not been entirely successful. Though several of the earliest 
successful legal challenges to school segregation involved students with 
disabilities, unresolved issues and continuing inequities for racial and 
ethnic minority students with disabilities persist. Therefore, states and 
the Office of Special Education Programs must take meaningful action 
to develop intervention programs that identify trends and practices in 
special education identification and referrals, so that policymakers have 
a greater understanding of which racial and ethnic minority groups are 
at-risk for over- or under-identification within special education place-
ments. Moreover, states must continue to support administrators and 
teachers by providing them with evidence-based and culturally respon-
sive approaches to identification, referral, and assessment procedures 
within special education. 
Finally, civil rights legislation in special education is inextricably 
linked to the civil rights struggle to secure education rights for racial 
and ethnic minority students across the U.S. While racial and ethnic 
minority students with disabilities face challenges that are different 
than those without disabilities, policymakers and administrators at the 
state and district-level must still be held responsible to all students and 
eliminate racial or ethnic segregation in special education, general edu-
cation, or advanced placement classes. Since future potential plaintiffs 
 
176. Id. at 194. 
177. Cavendish et al., supra note 89, at 37. 
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seem unlikely to have success by pursuing intentional discrimination 
claims, it is necessary to hold states accountable for non-discrimination 
in special education and related services using the limited means that 
are available for civil rights advocates. What remains uncertain, at this 
point, is whether the new regulations will be used to effectively monitor 
and address disproportionate representation at the state and district 
levels or whether it will result in continued intransigence over state- 
and district-level accountability towards racial and ethnic minority 
families and students with disabilities. 
